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Recognizing And Preserving Native American Treaty Usufructs in
The Supreme Court: the Mille Lacs Case
Michael R. Newhouse*
Great nations, like great men, should keep their word.
Justice Hugo Black
I. INTRODUCTION
As the Umted States executed its policy of manifest destiny across North
America, it faced a significant hurdle.' Native American tribes held property
rights in the lands they occupied.2 The Umted States entered into treaties to
acquire tribal lands in return for reservations, medical care, schools, traimng,
and annuities.3 These forms of consideration were important, but the corner-
stones of most treaties were retention of usufructuary4 hunting, fishing, and
gathering rights that were central to tribal economies, cultures and religions.5
The prenuse behind the modern usufruct-the right to enjoy resources from
land that belongs to another-was at the heart of pre-settlement native property
* J.D. and Certificate in Environmental Law and Natural Resources 2000, Northwestern School
of Law of Lewis and Clark College; B.A. 1996, University of Southern California (Political Science /Envi-
ronmental Studies). The author wishes to thank his family and friends for their support, and Professor
Michael Blumm for us extensive encouragement and guidance.
1. See Charles F Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of the
Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 375, 390 (1991) (manifest destiny).
2. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,574 (1823) (recognizing tribal occupancy rights
in land); see also Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 390 (settler's land needs); RONALD N. SATZ, CHIPPEWA
TREATYRIGHTS: THERESERVED RIGHTS OFWISCONSIN'S CHIPPEWAINDIANS INHISTORICALPERSPECTIVE
13 (Transactions Vol. 79, No. 1, Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts and Letters 1991) (government and
industry demand for inexpensive sources of timber were also central to treaty land acquisitions in Wiscolsin
and Minnesota).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 638 (9' Cir. 1998).
4. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1542 (7Th ed. 1999) ("A right to use another's property for a time
without damaging or diminishing it "). There is a legal distinction between usufructs and title or
occupancy. Treaty usufructs do not depend on title or occupancy. See Lac Courte Onelles Band of Lake
Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 700 F.2d 341,352 (7 " Cir. 1983) [hereinafter LCO 1].
5. See Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 387. See also Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v.
Minnesota, 861 F. Supp. 784, 796 (D.Minn. 1994)[hereinafter Phase ]. The court explained that the term
is an interpreter's simplification of the general right to live off of the land.
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rights systems. 6 For instance, tribal members did not own tracts of land out-
right. Instead, they held limited use rights in community-owned lands. These
interests might have included cutting birchbark during one season, and picking
bemes in another.7 In essence, instead of considering property rights as an all
encompassing "bundle of sticks," native paradigms conveyed "individual
sticks," as needed.8 This system reflected tribal tendencies to live nomadically
and to avoid overtaxing resources.9 Because the "individual sticks" tradition
was integral to native societies, its retention in the form of usufructs was often
a non-negotiable item in treaty negotiations. '0
The struggle to retain usufructs is illustrated by treaties between the United
States and the Chippewa natives that ceded lands in present day Wisconsin and
Minnesota." Almost immediately following these agreements, temtorial, and
later state authorities, enacted and enforced laws banning various tribal hunting
and fishing methods. 12 These authorities also argued that admission to the
Union, executive actions, or subsequent treaties terminated treaty usufructs. 3
Additionally, non-native fee holders commonly refused the Chippewa access
to ceded lands and conflicts--often violent-arose when the tribal members
continued to exercise their usufructs.
14
Today, the tribes contend that these treaty usufructs remain property rights
to enter and take resources from ceded lands. Further, these rights are not
inherently inconsistent with state land ownership, or subsequent fee title acqui -
sition by non-natives. 15 Consequently, property rights cannot be abrogated
without payment of just compensation by subsequent treaties, acts of state-
hood, or other non-explicit congressional actions. 16
6. Eric T. Freyfogle, Land Use and the Study ofEarly Amnercan History, 94 YALE L.J. 717, 722
(1985).
7. Id. (citing WILLIAM CRONON, CHANGES INTHE LAND: INDIANS, COLONISTS, ANDTHE ECOLOGY
OF NEW ENGLAND 63-64 (1983)).
8. Id. at 724-725. Modem legal scholars use the bundle of sticks metaphor to describe the scope
of use, exclusion and alienation rights concomitant with fee titles to land. Conversely, natives simply
recognized individual rights (sticks) which varied by user and by season.
9. Id. at 719-721.
10. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 387.
11. See Treaty of St. Peter's, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536; Treaty of La Pointe, Oct. 4, 1842, 7 Stat
591; Treaty ofLa Pointe, Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109.
12. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 394 (these laws included banning fishing with weirs, nets and spears).
13. See, e.g., Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896) (abrogating treaty nghts on the premise that
they are always irreconcilable with state sovereignty and the equal footing doctnne).
14. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 389 (citing E. DANZIGER,THE CHIPPEWAS OF LAKE SUPERIOR 96-97
(1978) ("Tribesmen roamed, half starved, through the temtory ceded in the 1840's and 1850's - hunting,
gathering, fishing, ")).
15. See generally Michael C. Blumm & Brett Swift, The Indian Treaty Piscarv Profit and Habitat
Protection in the Pacific Northwest: A Property Rights Approach, 69 U. COLO. L .REv 407, 484 n.385
(1998).
16. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986); Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States,
391 U.S. 404 (1968); Leavenworth, Lawrence, & Galveston Ry. Co. v. United States, 92 U.S. 733 (1876).
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These divergent perspectives have a stoned legal history 17 Last term, the
United States Supreme Court considered native treaty abrogation and the na-
ture of treaty usufructs mMinnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians.8
The Mille Lacs Band, 9 and the Umted States as intervener, sought declaratory
and injunctive relief to secure the band's usufructuary rights under an 1837
treaty Conversely, the state of Minnesota, counties, and landowners claimed
that the band lost those usufructs due to an executive order in 1850, a subse-
quent treaty in 1855, and Minnesota's admission to the Umon m 1858. The
Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opimon written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
rejected the state's position and upheld the Mille Lacs Band's usufructs.
Tis note argues that Mille Lacs represents the Court's long-awaited vindica-
tion of three assertions. First, courts must invoke the canons of Indian treaty
interpretation where congressional intent to diminish rights is ambiguous,
construing treaties liberally, as the natives understood them.2" Second, treaty
usufructs cannot be abrogated absent explicit congressional intent and without
payment of just compensation." Indeed, Justice O'Connor clarified that abro-
gation of Native American treaty rights may occur only through explicit con-
gressional language, or explicit evidence in the legislative history demonstrat-
ing that Congress considered the effect of its action on treaty rights and still
decided to abrogate those rights.22 Third, subsequent land cessions are not
inconsistent with continuing hunting, gathering, and fishing rights on those
lands. In fact, both the majority and dissent inMille Lacs recognized the tribal
usufruct as an enduring property right.'
Section H of this paper discusses the Chippewa treaties of 1837, 1842, 1854
and 1855, and provides an historical perspective on their negotiations.24 Sec-
17. See discussion infra Section III. See also Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574 (recognizing tribal
property rights); Worchester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 561 (1832) (recognizing tribal sovereignty); In re
Blackbird, 109 F. Supp. 139, 140 (W.D. Wis. 1901) (on reservation fishing not subject to state law); United
States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (recognizing off reservation fishing rights as property); State
v. Morn, 117 N.W. 1006, 1007 (Wis. 1908) (allowed Wisconsin to abrogate fisung rights on and off the
reservation); State v. Johnson, 249 N.W. 284,287 (Wis. 1933) (allowed state regulation of fee owned lands
on reservations); United States v. Michigan, 471 F. Supp. 192, 280-81 (W.D. Mich. 1979) (affirmed
Chippewa hunting and fishing rights under 1836 and 1855 treaties); United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp.
1316 (W.D.Wis. 1978); LCO , 700 F.2d at 351, 354, 356, 362, 364 (7" Cir. 1983) (1837 and 1842 treaties
created rights in the tribe, and under the canons the 1842 treaty did not abrogate the 1837 rights).
18. Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999).
19. See Phase I, 861 F.Supp. at 792. Judge Diana Murphy described a "band" as a political/
economic unit averaging twenty-five intermarried and cooperative families occupying a specific temtory.
20. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200.
21. Id. In the case of executive abrogation, that power must stem from an act of Congress, such as
a treaty, or the constitution itself. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
22. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202-03.
23. Id. at 194-95, 211-15.
24. Treaty of St. Peter's, July 29, 1837, 7 Stat. 536; Treaty of La Pointe, Oct. 4, 1842, 7 Stat. 591;
Treaty ofLa Pointe, Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat 1109; 1855 Treaty ofVWashngton, Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165.
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tions I and IV examine Mille Lacs' predecessor litigation and the state of the
law when the Mille Lacs controversy began. Section V is an analysis of the
Court's rejection of the three traditional treaty rights abrogation arguments in
Mille Lacs, and the Court's affirmation of tribal usufructs as property rights
that can co-exist with state and non-native fee titles. From this foundation,
Section VI asserts that Mille Lacs reaffirmed the canons of Indian treaty inter-
pretation, and raised the bar for demonstrating abrogation of usufructs by
adopting an explicitness standard. This section further asserts that Mille Lacs
recognized the validity and durability of tribal usufructs as property rights
-profits b prendre-even in the face of subsequent transfers of fee titles to
individuals. Finally, Section VII speculates on the legacy of Mille Lacs, sug-
gesting that three recent lower court decisions that diminished treaty rights and
failed to recognize usufructs as property rights are inconsistent with Mille
Lacs. 2 5
II. THE CHIPPEWA TREATIES
Expanding population and the federal government's goal of adding states to
the Union made acquisition of tribal lands imperative.26 However, securing
those lands was no small task. 7 Relations between the United States and the
Chippewa illustrate these challenges.
A. Challenges to Acquisitions of Chippewa Lands
During the mid-1830s, the Chippewa, also called the Ojibwa or Anishinabe,
occupied 27 million acres of land in present-day Wisconsin, Minnesota and
Michigan.28 These lands were attractive to settlers, and were heavily forested
with pine trees.29 Since the Supreme Court had recognized native property
rights in Johnson v M'Intosh, ° the United States needed to acquire these rights
before the lands could be settled or harvested. Additionally, securing titles was
25. See State of Washington Department of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation Dist., 850
P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993) (en bane); Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F Supp. 791 (D. Id. 1994); In
re SRBA, No. 39576 (Idaho Nov. 10, 1999) (order granting summary judgment).
26. Cf. Kenneth D. Nelson, Wisconsin, Walleye, and the Supreme Law of the Land: an Overview of
the Chippewa Indian Treaty Rights in Northern Wisconsin, 11 HAMLINEJ. PUB. L. & POL'y 381,384 (1990)
(land and natural resource needs); Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 383 (statehood goals).
27. The following discussion on the challenges to federal acquisition of tribal lands was influenced
by Wilkinson, supra note 1.
28. Id. (geographical scope); SATZ, supra note 2, at 1 (Ojibwa or Anishmabe).
29. SATZ, supra note 2, at 13.
30. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574. Chief Justice Marshall held that the European doctnne of
discovery was also applicable in the United States. Specifically, native tribes have a continuing possessory
right to the lands they occupied prior to the arrival of whites on the continent. However, the right is not
absolute but is subject to, the property rights of those who discovered the land: the federal government.
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important because citizens could not harvest Chippewa pine without federal
approval under the Indian Trade and Intercourse Acts.3"
Additionally, while the government undoubtedly possessed enough military
strength to subjugate the Chippewa tribes and seize their lands, invasion was
impractical. First of all, war would have been expensive, producing American
casualties.32 Indeed, Territorial Governor Henry Dodge feared such a result
and worked to avoid armed conflicts.33 Second, both Congress and the Su-
preme Court previously adopted positions of fair play and responsibility to-
wards Native Americans. For example, in 1787 Congress passed the North-
west Ordinance, applicable to Wisconsin and Minnesota, which required the
"utmost good faith" in dealings with northwestern tribes.34 Likewise, in Cher-
okee Nation v. Georgia, the Supreme Court held that the United States owed
a fiduciary duty to Native Americans.35 Consequently, treaties were necessary
to secure Chippewa lands.
B. The 1837 Treaty With the Chippew3 6
While acquisition of settlement lands was important, the need to secure pine
lands was at the heart of the 1837 Treaty negotiations. Indeed, Governor
Dodge impatiently attempted to reach a cession agreement before all of the
31. See SAaTz, supra note 2, at 14 (citing FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE
FORMATIVE YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTEROURSE ACTS, 1790-1834 2 (1953)). The series of Acts
were an attempt to protect natives from crimes by settlers. These included a licensing system for trade,
prohibitions on timber harvests, penalties for violations, and federal approval for property transfers.
32. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 385.
33. SATZ, supra note 2, at 15 (citing Letter From Henry Dodge, Territorial Governor of Wisconsin,
to Carey Allen Hams, Commirssioner of Indian Affairs (Aug. 7, 1837) (on file with the National Archives
and Records Service, Documents Relating to the Negotiations of Ratified and Unratified Treaties with
Various Indian Tribes, 1801-1869, Microcopy T494, Roll 3, Record Group 75). The letter stated, "I was
satisfied in my own mind that if a purchase was not made of this pine region of the country, by the United
States, there was great danger of our citizens being brought into a state of collision with the Chippewa
Indians, that would have resulted in bloodshed, and perhaps war." Id.
34. See SAr'z, supra note 2, at 3-4 (citing Northwest Ordinance. Reprinted in DOCUMENTS OFUNrrED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 9-10 (Francis Paul Prucha ed. 2d ed. 1990). The ordinance stated:
The utmost good faith shall always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and property shall never be
taken from them without their consent; and in their property, rights and liberty, they never shall be invaded
or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress; but laws founded in justice and
humanity shall from time to time be made, for preventing wrongs being done to them, and for preserving
peace and friendship with them. .Id.
35. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 385, n.47 (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 178
(1831)).
36. Treaty with the Chippewa 1837. This treaty is commonly known as the "Pine Tree Treaty," or
the "St. Peters Treaty." However, this note refers to the Treaty simply as "The 1837 Treaty With the
Chippewa" because the Supreme Court chose to do so in Mille Lacs. Similarly, the 1842, 1854 and 1855
Treaties will be referred to as "The 1842 Treaty With the Chippewa," "The 1854 Treaty With the
Chippewa," and "The 1855 Treaty With the Chippewa."
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tribes had arrived.3 7 The bands resisted Dodge, but the full tribal delegation
ultimately agreed to the government's terms on July 27, with one important
caveat. The Chippewa refused to relinquish pre-existing rights to hunt, fish,
and gather on the ceded lands. Leech Lake Chief Magegawbaw said to Dodge,
"We wish to hold onto a tree where we get our living, & to reserve the streams
where we drink the waters that give us life."38 Verplanck Van Antwerp, the
American secretary of the treaty council, acknowledged that Magegawbaw's
words were meant to reserve the right to hunt and fish and gather on the ceded
lands.39 Further, Chief Flat Mouth of the Pillager tribe stated, "My Father.
Your children are willing to let you have their lands, but they wish to reserve
the privilege of making sugar from the trees, and getting their living from the
Lakes and Rivers, as they have done heretofore, and of remaining in this Coun-
try "40 Clearly, the Chippewa would not have voluntarily entered into the 1837
Treaty without assurances that they would retain their hunting, fishing and
gathering rights.
The language of the 1837 Treaty demonstrated that the Chippewa did suc-
cessfully retain the right to live off of their ceded lands. Article V of the
Treaty stated that "[t]he privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild
rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded, is
guarantied [sic] to the Indians during the pleasure of the President of the
United States."'" These two provisions in the 1837 Treaty laid the foundation
for the ongoing dispute over property rights and treaty abrogation: what is the
legal status of the treaty hunting and fishing right, and what is required to
abrogate those rights9
C. The 1842 Treaty With the Chippewa
Following the 1837 Treaty, the United States developed a policy to remove
tribes from their ceded lands.42 To most government officials, removal was a
prerequisite to settlement and commerce. The 1837 Treaty embodied the
traditional strategy for encouraging removal by acquiring title to successive
hunting grounds until native relocation was a necessity However this strategy
proved ineffective with the Chippewa. As a result, many post-treaty settlers
37. SATZ, supra note 2, at 17.
38. Id. at 18 (citing Verplanck Van Antwerp, Proceedings of a Council Held by Governor Henry
Dodge, with the Chiefs and Principal Men, of the Chippewa Nation of Indians, July 20-29, 1837, at 0558-
559, on file with the National Archives and Record Service, Documents Relating to the Negotiations of
Ratified and Unratified Treaties with Various Indian Tribes, 1801-1869, Microcopy T494, Roll 3, Record
Group 75).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 19 (citing Van Antwerp, supra note 38, at 0560-56 1).
41. Treaty with the Chippewa, July 29, 1837, art. 5, 7 Stat. 536, 537.
42. Cf Nelson, supra note 26, at 384.
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arrived and found natives who refused to leave.43 The resulting conflicts over
occupation and the growing interest in copper mining led to more land cessions
in the 1842 Treaty with the Chippewa.' But, just as they had in the 1837
Treaty, the tribes insisted on retaining their usufructs in the 1842 Treaty 45
The 1842 Treaty did, however, differ in one significant way from the 1837
Treaty- The tribes' right to occupancy existed only until the President ordered
removal from the ceded lands.46 As with the "during the pleasure of the Presi-
dent of the United States" language in the 1837 Treaty, the natives interpreted
the 1842 removal provision differently than non-natives. The Chippewa under-
stood the removal provision to guarantee possessory and usufructuary rights on
ceded lands for as long as they re'mained at peace with white settlers.47 Chief
Martin of Lac Courte Oreilles, in correspondence with Commissioner of Indian
Affairs T. Hartley Crawford, clarified that the 1842 Treaty was signed only
after the government negotiator Robert Stuart assured protection from removal
so long as the tribes "behaved well."4
To many non-Chippewa the removal provision was a license to terminate
native possessory or usufructuary rights on the ceded lands. In Mille Lacs, the
Supreme Court noted that the late 1840s saw mounting pressure in the Minne-
sota Territory to remove Chippewa Bands.49 These pressures persuaded Presi-
dent Zachary Taylor to issue an executive order in 1850 purporting to remove
the Chippewa under Article II of the 1842 Treaty and to terminate their hunting
and fishing rights under Article V of the 1837 Treaty 50 Resulting conflicts
made removal impractical, however, and the United States soon abandoned its
removal policy 5
43. See SA'rz, supra note 2, at 30.
44. LCO 1, 700 F.2d at 345 (copper mining interest).
45. Treaty with the Chippewa, Oct. 4, 1842, art. 2, 7 Stat. 591,592. Article HI stated, "The Indians
stipulate for the right of hunting on the ceded territory, with the other usual privileges of occupancy, until
required to remove by the President of the United States,
46. Id.
47. SATz, supra note 2, at 39.
48. Id. at 40 (citing Chief Martin's discussion with subagent Alfred Brunson, (undated but before
January 8, 1943). Letter from Brunson to Governor James D. Doty (January 8, 1943) (on file with the
National Archives and Record Service, Office of Indian Affairs, Letters Received, La Pointe Agency,
Microcopy 234, Roll 388, Record Group 75)).
49. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 177. Justice O'Connor noted that the Minnesota Territorial Legislature,
at Governor Alexander Ramsey's urging, passed a Joint Resolution asking President Taylor to issue an
Executive Order removing the Chippewa from the ceded areas in the Minnesota Territory. Id.
50. Id. at 179.
51. Id. at 180-81. Justice O'Connor stated that government attempts to coerce removal by moving
annuity payments from La Pointe to Sandy Lake "ended in disaster" when approximately 380 Chippewa died
in the process of trying to retrieve their annuities and complete their journey home. Id.
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D The 1854 and 1855 Treaties With the Chippewa
Amid continuing conflicts over treaty rights, and unsuccessful attempts to
abrogate usufructs and remove the tribes through the 1850 Executive Order, the
United States entered into the 1854 Treaty with the Chippewa.52 The treaty
secured Chippewa lands in northern Minnesota, in exchange for reservations
and reserved hunting and fishing rights on the newly-ceded lands.53 However,
the 1854 Treaty made no mention of the 1837 and 1842 Treaty usufructs.
In 1855, Commissioner of Indian Affairs George Manypenny negotiated a
treaty with the Mississippi, Pillager and Winnibigoshish Chippewa.5 4 In con-
trast to the earlier treaties, the 1855 language was exceptionally broad, ceding
all Chippewa "right[s], title, and interests, in, and to, any other lands in the
Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere., 55 On its face, this language seemed to
be a cession of any and all Chippewa land rights on the face of the earth.
However, as the Supreme Court noted in Mille Lacs, the 1855 Treaty was
completely silent regarding hunting, gathering or fishing rights.56
The treaties of 1837, 1842, 1854, and 1855 laid a foundation for conflict
between the Chippewa and non-native settlers and their territorial and state
governments. To the Chippewa, the pacts were made to share their ancestral
lands while retaining the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights that were central
to their cultures. To modern tribal advocates, these usufructs remain as durable
property rights, generally able to endure subsequent acquisitions of fee ti-
tle-in other words, profits 'a prendre" Conversely, states and land owners
argue that Chippewa rights to hunt, fish, and gather were simply use rights of
limited duration. Thus, these rights are subservient to fee titles and can be
withdrawn explicitly or implicitly through executive or legislative action, such
52. Treaty with the Chippewas, Sept. 30, 1854, 10 Stat. 1109.
53. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 386. The 1854 Treaty With the Chippewa, Article XI, stated" [the
Chippewa of Lake Superior] shall have the right to hunt and fish therein, until otherwise ordered by the
President." Id.
54. Treaty with the Chippewas, Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165.
55. Id. art. I, 10 Stat. at 1165-1166. Article I stated in its entirety:
The Mississippi, Pillager, and Lake Winnibigoshish bands of Chippewa Indians hereby cede, sell,and convey
to the United States all their right, title, and interest in, and to, the lands now owned and claimed by them,
in the Territory of Minnesota, and included within the following boundaries viz: [list of boundaries]. And
the said Indians do further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United States, any and all right,
title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be, which they may now have in, and to any other
lands in the Territory of Minnesota or elsewhere.
56. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 184-85.
57. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1227 (7 h ed. 1999) (A right or privilege to go on another s land and
take away something of value from its soil or from the products of its soil (as by mining, logging, or
hunting)).
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as grants of statehood.58 The Supreme Court did not fully resolve these con-
flicting views for 150 years; however, several lower courts did address the
ongoing struggle during that time.
III. THE PREDECESSOR LmGATIoN
By the time Mille Lacs reached the Supreme Court in 1998, controversy over
native usufructuary rights had a longjudicial history 5 9 The controversy con-
cerned two general questions: first, what is the nature of treaty hunting, fishing
and gathering rights, and second, what is required to abrogate those rights9
These questions raise three specific inquiries: 1) what is the proper application
of the canons of Indian treaty interpretation; 2) how much congressional speci-
ficity is required to abrogate a treaty right; and 3) are treaty usufructs property
rights able to survive government conveyance of title to private parties?
A. Application of the Canons of Indian Treaty Interpretation
In Johnson v. M'Intosh and Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that the Umted States had a unique relationship-a fiduciary
obligation-to Native Americans.6" Many courts have evaluated this obliga-
tion using a set of canons to interpret treaties between tribes and the United
States.6' The canons of Indian treaty interpretation require courts to interpret
ambiguous treaty provisions in favor of the natives as the natives understood
them at the time the treaty was signed. 62 Further, courts should construe treaty
provisions liberally, to the advantage of the tribes.63
58. See Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 118 (1960) (allowing
general congressional actions to abrogate treaty provisions); Momn, 117 N.W. at 1007 (abrogation offishing
rights by statehood). Cf. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381, 384 (recogmzing treaty fishing rights as property but
subject to reasonable state regulation).
59. The cases discussed in this section do not all deal directly with the four Chippewa treaties, but
still serve to illustrate the evolution of the usufruct and abrogation questions.
60. Johnston v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
61. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman, Judicial Review of Indian Treaty
Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows or Grass Grows Upon the Earth" - How Long a Time is That?, 63
CAL. L. REV 601, 608-19 (1975).
62. Id. at 617 n.76-77 (citing, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970)
[hereinafter Choctaw 11]; United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116 (1938); Starrv. Long Jim, 227
U.S. 613, 622-23 (1913); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 582 (interpretation according to native understanding);
McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164,174 (1973); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363,367 (1930);
and Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908) (ambiguities construed in favor of the tribes)).
See also Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,675-
676 (1979) [hereinafter Fishing Vessel].
63. Wilkinson, supra note 61, at 617 n.78 (citing, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S.
423, 431-32 (1943) [hereinafter Choctaw Nation]; Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681,684-85 (1942); and
United States v. Walker River Irrigation Dist., 104 F.2d 334,337 (9" Cir. 1939). See also Nelson, supra note
26, at 382 (citing LCO 1, 700 F.2d at 365).
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For example, in Choctaw Nation v Oklahoma, Justice Thurgood Marshall's
majority opinion interpreted the Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek according to
Choctaw understanding because the tribe bargained from a weaker position and
the treaty was written in English.64 Similarly, in Choctaw Nation of Indians v
United States, Justice Frank Murphy reasoned that treaties are construed more
liberally than private contracts, especially where the United States is obliged
"to protect the interests of a dependent people."65
Lower courts have also used the canons to interpret the Chippewa Treaties
of 1837, 1842, 1854, 1855, and President Taylor's 1850 Executive Order,
which were the subjects of controversy in Mille Lacs. In 1978, in United
States v Bouchard, the Western District of Wisconsin held that the Lac Courte
Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians secured usufructuary rights
through the 1837 and 1842 Treaties.66 Judge James Doyle then held that the
1850 Executive Order exceeded President Taylor's power and did not abrogate
the usufructs. But, he also found that the 1854 Treaty did successfully abro-
gate the 1837 and 1842 usufructs.67
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Bouchard became Lac Courte Orielles
Band of Chippewa Indians v Wisconsin (LCO J).68 The LCO I court affirmed
Judge Doyle's opinion concerning the 1850 Executive order, but reversed
regarding abrogation by the 1854 Treaty Judge Pell noted that courts should
construe the removal provision "during the pleasure of the President"69 as the
natives understood it, not according to the technical understanding of law-
yers.70 The Chippewa delegation interpreted the removal provision to preserve
occupancy and usufructuary rights, so long as the tribes remained peaceful.7
Because there was no evidence of Chippewa misbehavior, the 1850 Order
exceeded the President's executive authority 72 The court further noted that the
1854 Treaty failed to mention usufructs on the lands ceded in the 1837 and
1842 Treaties. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit reasoned that there was no
64. Choctaw II, 397 U.S. at 620, 630-31 (citing Treaty of Dancing Rabbit Creek, Sept. 27, 1830, 7
Stat. 336). See also SATZ, supra note 2, at 28. As Native American scholar Ronald Satz notes in the
Chippewa context, the following two truths justify the canon: native tribes almost never spoke English; and
in most pre settlement native cultures business, rituals, and stories were all conducted or told orally, not in
writing.
65. Choctaw Nation, 318 U.S. at 431-32. The case interpreted a treaty Between the Choctaw and
Chickasaw Indians, April 28, 1866, arts. 3, 46, 14 Stat. 769, 780; Treaty Between Choctaw and Chickasaw
Indians, July 1, 1902, 32 Stat. 641.
66. United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1361 (W.D. Wis. 1978) rev d sub nor. Lac Courte
Oreilles band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983).
67. Id.
68. LCO 1, 700 F.2d at 343. The LCO saga is more comprehensively treated in Nelson, supra note
26.
69. Id. at 351.
70. Id. (citing Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1899).
71. See Chief Martin's discussion, supra note 49 and accompanying text.
72. Wilkinson, supra note 1, at 392 (citing LCO 1, 700 F.2d at 362).
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abrogation because the Chippewa considered those previously secured usu-
fructs to be separate from the 1854 Treaty, and thus felt no need to secure
additional guarantees m 1854."
LCO I led to Lac Courte Orielles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians
v. Wisconsin (LCO II1),7 which appliedthe canons of treaty construction m two
important ways.75 First, the court held that only Congress can abrogate treaties
unless the treaty itself provides for other means. Thus, state or private actions
could not abrogate the 1837 Treaty because the Chippewa did not understand
such scenarios as possibilities at treaty time.76 However, the state could burden
the usufruct by enacting necessary, non-discriminatory conservation regula-
tions. 77 Second, the court allowed the Chippewa to use modem fishing meth-
ods, and to sell the fruits of the usufruct.78 Further, Judge Doyle broadly inter-
preted the resources covered in the 1837 and 1842 usufructs because the tribes
understood those rights to cover extensive flora and fauna.79
In LCO IV, following Judge Doyle's death, Judge Barbara Crabb inherited
the LCO saga and added a limit to LCO III's liberal application of the canons.80
In addition to endorsing state regulation for conservation necessities, Judge
Crabb affirmed that the state could regulate treaty usufructs in the name of
necessary and non-discrimnatory public health protections."1
73. Id. (citing LCO I, 700 F.2d at 364).
74. LCO I and LCO 11 were separated by Lac Courte Onelles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d 177, (7"' Cir. 1985) [hereinafter LCO II]. However, LCO II is not further
discussed here because the decision did not consider the proper application of the canons of Indian treaty
interpretation; which are the focal points of the LCO I and LCO III decisions. LCO 11 simply interpreted a
separate part of the LCO Icourt's holding pertaimng to the exercise of native treaty usufructs on private land.
See Nelson, supra note 26, at 388.
75. LCO Ii, 653 F. Supp at 1422.
76. Nelson, supra note 26, at 389 (citing LCO III, 653 F Supp. at 1434).
77. Id. (citing LCO III, 653 F. Supp. at 1435). The court did not specify what constituted necessary
conservation, however Lac Courte Onelles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 707 F.
Supp. 1034,1058 (W.D. Wis. 1989)[hereinafter LCO V] held thatWisconsm's attempt to limit tribal harvest
to twenty percent of the allowable catch was not a legitimate conservation need. In reality it was an end run
to establish an allocation that the court declined to order.
78. Id. (citing LCO 111, 653 F Supp. at 1435).
79. Id. (citing LCO I1, 653 F. Supp. at 1426-28.) Indeed, virtually every interpretation of LCO III
points out the extensive scope of Judge Doyle's resource list; over a page and a half long in the reporter.
80. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233
(W.D. Wis. 1987) [hereinafter LCO IV].
81. Nelson, supra note 26, at391,402 (citingLCO IV, 668 F. Supp. at 1239,1270). Some light was
shed on this standard in Lac Courte Onelles Band of Lake Superior Indians v. Wisconsin, 740 F. Supp. 1400,
1421-1424 (W.D. Wis. 1990) (where the court allowed Wisconsin to limit "sining" and summertime deer
hunting in the name of public safety). Judge Crabb issued the final installment of this thirteen-year saga in
the wake of the 1978 Bouchard decision on February 21, 1991. Lac Courte Onelles Band of Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin, 758 F.Supp. 1262 (W.D. Wis. 1991) [hereinafter LCO VIII] (amended on
March 22, 1991 to amend a spelling error). In LCO VIII, the court held that logging was not part of the 1837
and 1842 usufructs because the Chippewa were not engaged in logging when the treaties were signed.
Therefore, they could not have understood the Treaty to guarantee such a right.
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B. The Pre-Mille Lacs Requirement for Native Treaty Abrogations
In Lone Wolf v Hitchcock, the Supreme Court held that Congress possessed
the plenary power to abrogate treaties with Native Americans.12 However, the
pre-Mille Lacs case history has been inconsistent regarding the standard for
exercising that abrogation power. For example, the Supreme Court has alterna-
tively held that general act of Congress can abrogate treaty rights, while also
ruling that abrogation requires an express congressional declaration, and
should not be imputed absent "explicit statutory language. "83
In 1986, the Court delivered its most definitive pre-Mille Lacs explanation
of an abrogation requirement. While invalidating an 1858 Yankton Sioux
treaty the Court noted that it would not rigidly adopt a per se requirement of
explicit congressional "language" to abrogate treaty rights.84 Instead, Justice
Marshall explained a two-part abrogation standard: To abrogate treaty rights,
an "explicit" statement by Congress is preferred.15 However, absent explicit-
ness, "[w]hat is essential is clear evidence that Congress actually considered
the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian treaty rights
on the other, and chose to resolve that conflict by abrogating the treaty "6 This
standard opened the door for less that explicit congressional language to abro-
gate native treaty rights.87
82. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). The Court did not discuss an abrogation standard
because the relevant bill explicitly modified the treaty rights in question.
83. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 120 (1960) (general acts or
Congress suffice to abrogate treaty rights). The inconsistency of this decision with the government's
fiduciary duty to the natives did not go unrecognized by at least three members of the Court. In a moving
dissent, Justice Black wrote "I regret that this Court is to be the governmental agency that breaks faith with
this dependent people. Great nations, like great men, should keep their word." Id. at 142 (Black, J.
dissenting). Eight years later Justice Douglas, who joined the Tuscarora dissent, wrote that congressional
intent to abrogate treaties should not be imputed casually. Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 412-13. See also
Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690 (reluctance to find abrogation absent explicit language); Leavenworth Rv..
92 U.S. at 741 (requiring express congressional declaration); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S.
286, 296-297 (1942) (explicit statement by Congress is preferable).
84. Dion, 476 U.S. at 739.
85. Id. (citing Seminole Nation, 316 U.S. at 296-297). Explicit statements help to ensure legislative
accountability for treaty abrogations.
86. Id. at 740.
87. See South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679, 687, 689 (1993). Justice Thomas, writing for a
7-2 majority, relied on the Dion standard to allow the Flood Control and Cheyenne River Acts to abrogate
tribal right to regulate hunting and fishing under the Fort Laramie Treaty. The Court did not cite specific
language but in reasoning reminiscent of Tuscarora, held that the taking of reservation lands for public use
abrogated the tribal right of regulation. Id. However, this decision was not cited by the Supreme Court in
Mille Lacs.
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C. The Nature of Tribal Hunting, Fishing and Gathering Rights
In Mille Lacs, the Supreme Court recogmzed off-reservation usufructs as
property interests-profits a prendre, property rights to take natural resources
from lands owned in fee simple by another.88 However, prior to Mille Lacs
several courts struggled with defimng, and limiting, treaty usufructs.
In United States v. Winans, the Supreme Court held that treaty fishing rights
were reserved property interests, existing prior to non-native settlement. 9
Similarly, the LCO I court acknowledged treaty usufructs as property interests,
but refused to recognize those rights on private lands, unless they were open
to the public by operation of state law 9 Further, in LCO III, the court held
that tribal usufructs were subject to state regulation for reasonable and neces-
sary conservation.9 And in LCO IV, the court upheld non-discrimnatory
regulation to protect public health or safety 92 However, at least one commen-
tator interpreted these limitations to be quite narrow 93
88. See BLACK'SLAWDICIONARY 1227(7thed. 1999); See alsoMiUle Lacs, 526U.S. at 195,204.
While Justice O'Connor did not use the term profits a prendre the opinion strongly suggests such a
classification. Id.
89. United States v.Winans, 198 U.S. 371,380-82 (1905). Specifically, theserights created a "right
in land," a "servitude." See also Blumm & Swift, supra note 15, at 484 n.385 (citing Winans, 198 U.S. at
371 (usufruct burdened private fish wheel operators); Seufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194
(1919) (usufructs burdened a pnvate party); Tulee v. Waslungton, 315 U.S. 681 (1942); Puyallup Tribe
v. Dep't of Game, 391 U.S. 392 (1968); Department of Game v. Puyallup, 414 U.S. 44 (1973); Fishing
Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690 (usufructs burdened the state in all four cases); United States v. Washington, 1998
U.S. App. LEXIS 1109, at *35 (usufruct could be exercised whether the land was privately or publicly
owned). Other courts have impliedly recognized treaty rights as property; see United States v. Creek
Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109 (1935) (recognizing that the government's power to appropriate tribal lands
carried with it the duty to provide just compensation for those lands). See also Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S.
at 412-13 (declinmg to terminate a treaty fishing right out of fear that the abrogation would be a taking
entitled to compensation at a tremendous cost to the government). However, this decision applied to on
reservation rights, not usufructs.
90. LCO1, 700 F.2d at 365 n.14. This note argues, infra Section IV, that Mille Lacs broadened the
LCO holdings, allowing the exercise of usufructs on private lands. These property rights are only
defeasible by clear congressional abrogation, abrogation at the "pleasure of the President," or necessary
and non-discriminatory safety or conservation regulations.
91. LCO III, 653 F. Supp. at 1435.
92. LCO IV, 668 F Supp. at 1238 (citing Puyallup Tribe, 391 U.S. at 398.).
93. See Nelson, supra note 26, at 391. Nelson argued that four factors must be met before the
conservation exception is applicable: 1) regulations must be reasonable and necessary; 2) they must restrict
treaty rights as minimally as possible; 3) conservation goals must be attempted against non-natives first;
and 4) regulations cannot discriminate against natives. Similarly, the five factors to meet the health and
safety requirement are: 1) a safety or health risk must exist; 2) the regulation must be needed to prevent
the risk; 3) regulating the tribe must be necessary to counter the risk; 4) regulations must be nummally
restrictive; and 5) states may not discrmnate against natives, or favoring of non-natives.
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IV THE LOWER COURT DECISIONS
Several courts consider usufructs to be property rights, but the resiliency of
those rights in the face of subsequent fee title transfers and general congressio-
nal acts has been the subject of considerable judicial debate.94 In two separate
opinions, the District Court of Minnesota considered whether the 1837 Chip-
pewa usufructs survived the 1850 Executive Order, the 1855 Treaty, Minnesota
statehood, and title transfers to private citizens.95
A. Phase I
The Mille Lacs Band, joined by the United States, filed suit against the State
of Minnesota's Department of Natural Resources, and several counties and
landowners intervened. The band claimed that the state enacted and enforced
laws and regulations diminishing the band's usufructuary rights under the 1837
Treaty The Band and the government sought three remedies: 1) a declaratory
judgment confirming the continuing validity of the usufructs; 2) a declaration
defining the limits of state regulation of those usufructs; and 3) an injunction
prohibiting state action beyond the scope of the declaration.96 The state argued
that either the 1850 Executive Order or the 1855 Treaty abrogated the 1837
rights.97 Judge Diana Murphy9 8 held that neither the 1850 Order nor the 1855
Treaty abrogated the 1837 usufructs. Finally, while the court noted a need to
consider the permissible scope of state regulation and the durability of the
usufructs following title transfers to non-federal entities, it reserved those
issues for Phase H.99
Relying on the canons of treaty interpretation, Judge Murphy held that Presi-
dent Taylor's 1850 Order to remove the Chippewa to unceded lands and termi-
nate their 1837 usufructuary rights" was invalid and did not authorize re-
moval, because the Band did not understand the 1837 Treaty to call for re-
94. See Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 rev din part, Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 205-08.
95. Phase 1, 861 F.Supp. 784; Mille Lacs Band of Chippeiva Indians v. Minnesota, 952 F Supp.
1362 (D.Minn. 1997) [hereinafter Phase I]. Justice O'Connor referred to the bifurcated district court
opinions as "Phase I" and "Phase II." For consistency, this note does the same.
96. Phase !, 861 F Supp. at 789.
97. Id. at 789-90.
98. When Phase I was decided, Judge Murphy was Chief Judge for the District of Minnesota. By
the time the dispute reached the Eighth Circuit she had joined that Circuit but took no part in the appellate
decision.
99. See Phase 1, 861 F Supp. at 838-39.
100. Id. at 803-04. President Taylor's 1850 Executive Order read: "The privileges granted tempo-
rarily to the Chippewa Indians of the Mississippi by the fifth article of the treaty made with them on the
2 9 h of July 1837 'of hunting, fishing and gathering the wild rice, upon the lands, the rivers and the lakes
included in the territory ceded' by that treaty to the United States are hereby revoked; and all of the
said Indians remaining on the land ceded aforesaid, are required to remove to their unceded lands."
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moval if they remained at peace with the settlers."0' Because the 1850 removal
order was invalid, the court held the provision abrogating the 1837 usufructs
was also invalid and could not be "severed" from the removal provision.1°2
Judge Murphy's decision also rejected the state's contention that the 1855
Treaty abrogated the 1837 usufructs.' °3 Although it acknowledged the broad
nature of the treaty's language,"14 the court ruled that the treaty was not a suc-
cessful abrogation because the Chippewa did not understand the treaty to abro-
gate their rights to hunt, fish and gather,10 5 nor did the language of the treaty
make any mention of the 1837 usufructs. 6
Finally, the court rejected the landowners' claims that subsequent land pat-
101. Id. at 810-11. Judge Murphy noted thatwhile Article V of the 1837 Treaty limited the usufruct
"during the pleasure of the President of the United States," the Chippewa did not understand the language
as a removal provision because they were not familiar with Euro-Amencan temporal restrictions on
occupancy. Further, removal was not discussed during the negotiations, and the Chippewa had steadfastly
insisted on retaining the usufructs that were central to their existence. Id. at 796-97. The court also cited
a 1837 letter from a missionary reporting that the Chippewa did not comprehend the 1837 Treaty as a
removal treaty. Id at 797 (citing Letter from William Boutwell, Missionary, to Reverend Greene (Aug. 17,
1837) (located at Plaintiffs' Ex. 54, at 2)). The Chippewa also demonstrated their belief in the durability
of their usufructuary rights by risking their lives to challenge a dam built by lumbermen on ceded lands.
The conflict resulted in one tribal and two Amencan deaths and required federal troops. However, even
Lieutenant J. Hamilton, commander of the federal troops, acknowledged the continuing existence of the
1837 usufructuary rights. Id. at 809-10; Letter from J. Hamilton to Stewart (Mar. 9, 1855) (located at
Plaintiffs' Ex. 18).
102. Id. at 825-26. The court explained that invalid sections of executive orders are only severable
where evidence demonstrates that the executive would have still chosen to enact the unsevered portion
alone, and that portion would still be fully operable as a law. Because the 1850 Order was primarily a
removal order, and only included abrogation of usufructs to encourage removal, the severability test was
not satisfied. Id. at 825 (citing Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210, 234 (1932)).
Furthermore, the court held that even if the abrogation provision was severable, that provision itself was
invalid. The government had an obligation to deal in good faith with the Chippewa, and to only revoke
usufructs for bad behavior. Evidence in both LCO I and Phase I showed no evidence of usbehavior, thus
abrogation was in bad faith, and the clause was invalid. Id. at 827.
103. See Id. at 815-16.
104. Phase 1, 861 F.Supp at 815-17. The court reasoned that the language was not broadly drafted
to deprive the Chippewa all rights, but because the government was not completely certain of the extent
of Chippewa land claims throughout Minnesota
105. ' Id. at 813,83 1. The court reasoned that the Chippewa did not understand the Treaty to abrogate
rights, but solely as a means to sell land to a government in need of it, while securing needed money and
goods for themselves, Chief Hole-in-the-Day commented "[y]our words strike us in this way. They are
very short. 'I want to buy your land."' Similarly, Cluef Flatmouth stated "[i]t appears to me that I under-
stand what you want, and your views from the few words I have heard you speak. You want land." Id. at
813. Furthermore, Judge Murphy noted that after the 1855 Treaty was signed, the Mille Lacs Band, and
the Chippewa in general, continued to hunt, fish and gather throughout the lands ceded in the 1837 Treaty.
These practices went unchallenged by the federal government. Id. at 818, 831. Moreover, even into the
twentieth century Cluppewa exercised their usufructuary rights on lands ceded in the 1837 Treaty. In one
case, tribesmen even opened a commercial fishery on ceded lands adjacent to Lake Mille Lacs. Id. at 821.
106. Id. at 815-16, 830. The court cited Dion's requirement that either express language or clear and
plain, evidence demonstrate congressional intent to abrogate rights. Because the 1855 Treaty made no
reference to the 1837 usufructs, it was an invalid abrogation. Id. at 830.
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ents issued by the federal government abrogated the 1837 usufructs. 7 Be-
cause the Chippewa did not understand the 1837 Treaty to grant usufructs
subject to subsequent land transfers by the federal government, 0 8 the court
held that allowing such abrogations in the absence of congressional intent
would be an abuse of discretion.109 The Phase I court also held, at the urging
of the Band, that the 1837 usufructs were not profits a prendre because the
1837 Treaty did not grant the Band a right of access to ceded lands. The treaty
did however grant the tribes the privilege to self-regulate the exercise their
usufructs. "0 While it seems strange that the tribes would argue that their usu-
fructs were not property rights, this was most likely because they feared that
a classification as "property" would sweep their hunting, fishing and gathering
rights into the broad scope of the 1855 Treaty's abrogations which extin-
guished "all right, title, and interest" to Chippewa lands."'
B. Phase H
Three years later, in Phase II, the court considered whether treaty usufructs
could be exercised on private lands. 12 The Bands argued that because Phase
I affirmed its right to self-regulate the exercise of usufructs, it should be free
to secure independent agreements with landowners to exercise those rights on
private property 113 Judge Davis disagreed with the Bands and held that the
right to exercise the usufruct only applied to public lands and private lands
opened to the public by operation of law 114 Therefore the right did not apply
to private lands, even if band members secured consent from individual land-
owners.115 Because the treaty did not grant a right of access to the Bands, they
107. Id. a t 835-36.
108. Id. at 835. In 1855, after the United States sold ceded lands to timbermen, Governor Gorman,
in correspondence to Commissioner Manypenny, acknowledged that the Chippewa still held fishing and
hunting rights on the lands.
109. Id. at 836. Illustrating a lack of intent the court pointed out that only one year earlier, the
United States negotiated a treaty which, unlike the 1837 Treaty, clearly subjected usufructs to termination
by subsequent land transfers. Id. at 835.
110. Id. at 834.
111. Treaty with the Chippewa, Feb. 22, 1855, 10 Stat. 1165. Conversely, in Mille Lacs, discussed
infra Section V, the Supreme Court recognized the usufructs as property rights without subjecting those
rights to the 1855 Treaty abrogations.
112. Phase II, 952 F Supp. 1362 (D.Minn. 1997).
113. Id. at 1376.
114. Id. at 1378-79 (citing Phase I and LCO VII). The court accepted the Minnesota tree growth tax
as an example of an "operation of state law" where land owners receive favorable tax status in return for
granting public rights of access.
115. Id. at 1378, 1379. Judge Davis referred to the "consent" issue as a red herring. He noted that
in LCO VII, tribal members attempted to assert their usufructs on private lands with owner consent. There
the court agreed with the state of Wisconsin that this could not be done because case by case owner
consent to exercise usufructs had the potential to provide individual band members with more rights that
other members. Since the 1837 Treaty conveyed rights to the band as a whole, individual land owner/band
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could not skirt their duty to obey state regulations by securing a right to hunt
on private lands from the owners.
116
However, this holding appears inconsistent with Phase L Judge Murphy
noted that while the 1837 Treaty did not convey a profit a prendre, the tribes
reserved the right to regulate the taking of wildlife on ceded lands. "17 Hence,
under the Phase I holding, it would seem that the Chippewa do not have to
obey state hunting or fishing regulations, because the 1837 Treaty reserved to
them the right of self-regulation. Further, in Mille Lacs, the Supreme Court
disagreed with the conclusion that the 1837 Treaty did not grant "access."
Justice O'Connor clarified that the treaty granted both the right to continue to
occupy the ceded lands, and to exercise their usufructs on those lands.'18
C. The Appeal
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's holdings in Phase L First,
it agreed that the 1850 Executive Order was invalid as a removal and abroga-
tion action.19 The court concluded that President Taylor had no authority to
remove the Chippewa through the 1850 Order because the Removal Act of
1830 required tribal agreement for removal, and the Chippewa had not as-
sented. 2° Similarly, the provision in the 1850 Order revoking the 1837 usu-
fructs was not severable because it was enacted primarily as a removal, not an
abrogation order.1
2
'
Second, the Eighth Circuit agreed that the 1855 Treaty did not abrogate the
1837 usufructs. 2 Invoking the canons of Indian treaty interpretation, the court
reasoned that neither the government nor the Chippewa understood the Treaty
member agreements would violate the spirit of the treaty. Similarly, the court was not comfortable with
the potential for landowners to discnminate in granting access, which in turn would place an undue burden
on state conservation officials who would have to individually contact landowners to determine whether
an access agreement existed before they could deternune if laws were being broken. Thus, the court
labeled the consent issue "legally gratuitous." Id. at 1378 (citing LCO VII, 740 F Supp. at 1420).
116. Id. at 1378-79.
117. Phase 1,861 F. Supp. at 834,838-39. "The state may not impose its own regulations if the band
can effectively self-regulate and if tribal regulations are adequate to meet conservation, public health, and
public safety needs." Id. at 839.
118. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 194, n.5.
119. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians v. Minnesota, 124 F.3d 904, 914-918 (8"' Cir. 1997)
[hereinafter Mille Lacs Appeal].
120. Id. at 917 ("[if Congress required consent for removal, and the Bands did not consent, then
President Taylor had no authority for his 1850 Executive Order of removal."] li
121. Id. at 918 (citing Champlin,, 286 U.S. at 234, where the court noted that severability only
applies where the President would have independently enacted the severed provision, and it would be fully
operational as a law on its own).
122. Id. at 921.
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to abrogate usufructs. In fact, both parties continued to behave in a manner
that recognized the usufructs after the 1855 Treaty 123
Third, the court rejected Minnesota's argument that its statehood act abro-
gated the 1837 Treaty rights under the equal footing doctrine. 124  The state
argued that under the Tenth Amendment states must be adrmtted to the Union
on equal footing, acquiring among other rights, the sovereign right to regulate
their natural resources. 125 However, the court held that the 1837 usufructs were
"in no way tied to [continuing land] ownership, but instead were intended to
be continuing rights."'126 States, the court held, must respect these non-posses-
sory property rights unless they interfere with a necessary and non-discnmlni-
tory conservation or public safety law 127
V THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1998, the Mille Lacs
controversy symbolized the struggle to affirm vital Native American treaty
123. Id. at 920-21. The Eighth Circuit also distinguished Klamath Tribe, as did the Supreme Court
later. In Klamath Tribe, the tribe "cede[d], surrender[ed], grant[ed], and convey[ed] to the United States
all their claim, right title and interest in and to," incorrectly surveyed portions of their reservation lands
in Oregon which abrogated its hunting and fishing rights. However, the Eighth Circuit distinguished this
case, noting that those cessions concerned exclusive, on-reservation rights, which were naturally termi-
nated when the tribe ceded reservation lands. Oregon Dep't of Fish & Wildlife v. Klamath Indian Tribe,
473 U.S. 753,760 (1985). Conversely, in Mille Lacs, the lands at issue were non-exclusive, off-reservation
rights, and were not even mentioned in the 1855 Treaty. Mille Lacs Appeal, 124 F.3d at 925, 926; Mille
Lacs, 526 U.S. at 198.
124. Mille Lacs Appeal, 124 F.3d at 926-27. This equal footing argument was originally raised and
rejected as part of the Phase //litigation. No. 3-94-1266 (D.Minn., Mar. 29, 1996)(Davis, J.), App. to Pet.
For Cert. 182-189. While questions of fact cannot be invoked on appeal if not first raised at trial, the court
allowed the equal footing argument because it was raised in both parts of the bifurcated Fond du Lac trial
(Fond du Lac Band of Chippewa Indians v. Carlson, No. 5-92-159 (D.Minn. Mar. 18, 1996)), and it was
a question of law that had been fully briefed by all parties. Mille Lacs Appeal, 124 F.3d at 926 n.40.
125. Mille Lacs Appeal, 124 F.3d at 926.
126. Id. at 927. This sentence suggests that the Chippewa usufructs should be viewed as property
rights, albeit defeasible in some situations (conservation or safety) but able to endure transfers of owner-
ship. It further appears to be an ability to exercise a right in the soil of another; a profit a prendre. This
seems to run counter to the district court's holding that the 1837 usufructs are not profits a prendre, and
cannot be exercised on private lands unopened to the public by operation of law. See Phase !, 861 F Supp.
at 834.
127. Id. at 928 (citing Winans, 198 U.S. at 378 (binding the state of Washington to a tribal right to
take fish at their usual and accustomed places in common with Territorial citizens, and refemng to
usufructs not as grants, but as rights retained by the tribes; a remnant of the "great rights they possessed"
before Europeans arrived)). See also Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942) which followed Winans
and allowed natives to rely on off-reservation treaty rights in conflict with state regulation unless the state
laws were needed for conservation. Again these characterizations of the usufruct as an enduring property
right makes the court's ultimate denial of the usufructs consistent with subsequent fee title acquisition by
private parties seem unsupported. Finally, relying on Dion, the court rejected abrogation because there
was no evidence that Minnesota's Admission Act contemplated the 1837 usufructs. Mille LacsAppeal, 124
F.3d at 929.
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rights. In a 5-4 opinion, Justice O'Connor affirmed the District Court of Min-
nesota and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that neither President
Taylor's 1850 Executive Order, the 1855 Treaty, norMinnesota's 1858 Adrms-
sion Act abrogated the 1837 Treaty usufructs. 28
A. The 1850 Executive Order
Justice O'Connor agreed with the Eighth Circuit's holding (and neither party
disputed) that the 1830 Removal Act did not authorize President Taylor's 1850
removal order because Congress only authorized removal in exchange for other
lands, which the 1850 Order did not offer. 29 The Court also considered
whether the provision revoking the 1837 usufructs could be severed from the
invalid removal provision,130 and it held that the order could be severed if the
evidence showed that President Taylor would have enacted the abrogation
provision alone, and if that independent provision would have been lawful. "'
The Court opined that President Taylor intended the order to operate as a
single coherent policy 132 Justice O'Connor acknowledged that the order con-
templated two separate events: removal and abrogation of the 1837 usu-
fructs.1 33 Since the government implemented the order only as a removal ac-
tion, however, and not as an abrogation of usufructuary rights, the Court saw
this as evidence that President Taylor would not have enacted the order solely
128. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 176 Additionally, departing from the lower courts, yet within the spirit
of the Eighth Circuiet's language, Justice O'Connor signaled that the 1837 Treaty usufructs are indeed
durable property rights (though subject to limited defeasibility);profits aprendre are able to withstand title
transfers to states and even individuals in certain circumstances. See discussion infra Section VI. Justice
O'Connor did not explicitly use the term "profits aprendre" however she acknowledged that the Chippewa
retained the right to occupy their ceded lands in the 1837 Treaty, and that even after a fee title transfer to
private timbermen, the right to hunt and fish still survived. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 182. When combined,
these findings affirm a right to access the lands of another, and take natural resources from those lands: a
profit a prendre. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
129. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 189. However, citing Youngstown, Justice O'Connor also clarified that
"the Removal Act did not forbid" such an order. Thus, the Court was obligated to look for other constitu-
tional or congressional authority authorizing the Order. Id. at 188-89 (citing Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585).
Subsequently, the Court addressed the landowners' contention that the 1837 Treaty itself authorized the
1850 Order. Justice O'Connor stated "[tihere is no support for this proposition .... [t]he Treaty makes no
mention of removal, and there was no discussion of removal during the Treaty negotiations." Id. at 189.
Likewise, the government often negotiated removal explicitly, but did not in the 1837 Treaty. Id. at 189-90
n.4 (listing four other 1837 treaties which explicitly addressed removal).
130. Id. at 191. The Court acknowledged that it had never decided the severability of executive
orders. However, because the Eighth Circuit used the statutory severability test, and no parties objected,
the Court assumed arguendo that the test was appropriate in this context.
131. Id. (citing Champlin, 286 U.S. at 234).
132. Ld.
133. Id. at 178-79.
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for the purpose of abrogation.'34 Therefore the Court held that the order was
not severable, nor were its removal and abrogation provisions authorized.'35
B. The 1855 Treaty
Justice O'Connor noted that the 1855 Treaty used very broad language to
cede extensive Chippewa lands within Minnesota territory However, she
wrote that "[t]he Treaty makes no mention of hunting and fishing rights,
whether to reserve new usufructuary rights or to abolish rights guaranteed by
previous treaties."' 36 The Court also reasoned that subsequent Chippewa ac-
tions, such as challenges to construction of the Rum River Dam within ceded
lands, and Governor Gorman's acknowledgment that the Chippewa retained
usufructs even after the land was sold to lumbermen, were evidence that the
tribes would have understood the 1837 usufructs to survive the 1855 Treaty 137
Further, according to the Court, the purpose of the 1855 Treaty was to secure
land for the United States, not to extinguish Chippewa usufructs.' 3 8 Justice
O'Connor noted that the 1854 statute authorized negotiations to extinguish
native land rights in Wisconsin and Minnesota, but did not mention abrogation
of usufructs.' 9 The Court also cited the district court's factual findings in
Phase I and the treaty negotiations to support its interpretation that the only
purpose of the1855 Treaty was to secure land cessions. t40 Finally, the Court
would not subscribe to the notion that the Chippewa forfeited their usufructs
by not addressing the subject during negotiations."11 Thus, according to the
Court, the 1855 Treaty did not abrogate the 1837 usufructs. ' 2
134. Id. at 179-80 (describing the "circular" which mentioned removal, but failed to mention abroga-
tion).
135. Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed with this part of the holding. Id. at 212-13. Justice O'Connor
suggested that the Chief Justice incorrectly presumed that the President held an inherent power to remove
tribes from public lands. She stated that Chippewa property rights on the ceded lands predated American
title, and that the Chippewa understood the 1837 usufructs to retain their right to occupy the ceded lands.
Therefore, Chief Justice Rehnquist's position was inconsistent with the canons of Indian treaty interpreta-
tion. Similarly, Justice O'Connor rejected the Chief Justice's contention that the executive order's provi-
sions were severable because of the presumption of legality for executive actions. In this case, she said,
that presumption is trumped by the canons. Id. at 194, n.5.
136. Id. at 184-85.
137. Id. at 182, 202.
138. Id. at 202.
139. Id. at 196-97 (citing Act of December 19, 1854, ch. 7, 10 Stat. 598). The Court continued that
the silence concerning usufructs was not accidental. Senator Sebastian, Chairman of the Committee oi
Indian Affairs, openly stated that the treaties under the Act would reserve the rights secured under former
treaties. CONG. GLOBE, 33d Cong., 1V Sess. 1404 (1854).
140. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 196-98; see also discussion supra note 105 and accompanying text.
141. Id. at 198-99.
142. Id. at 202. Affirming the Eighth Circuit, the Court rejected the assertion that Klamath Tribe
bound the Court to find abrogation. Id. at 200-02. See discussion supra note 124 and accompanying text.
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C. The Admission Act and the Equal Footing Doctrine
The Supreme Court also held that Minnesota's 1858 Admission Act did not
abrogate the 1837 usufructs because it was silent with respect to Indian treaty
rights. ' Justice O'Connor cited Menominee, Dion, and Fishing Vessel, ruling
that Congress must "clearly express" its intent to abrogate treaty rights, or a
party must show "clear evidence" that Congress considered the effect of abro-
gation on the natives, yet still chose to terminate the rights. " The opinion
noted that the language of the Act "provides no clue that Congress considered
the reserved rights of the Chippewa and decided to abrogate those rights when
it passed the Act," nor did the legislative history 145 Therefore, the Act did not
satisfy either prong of the abrogation requirement. 4 6
Minnesota argued that Ward v. Race Horse stood for the proposition that the
equal footing doctrine meant that statehood abrogates treaty usufructs. 47 In
part, Race Horse did hold that treaty rights inherently conflicted with states'
powers to regulate natural resources; according to Minnesota therefore,
usufructs infringed on state sovereignty and violated the equal footing
doctrine. 48 However the Court rejected Minnesota's position and ruled that
Race Horse "rested on a false premse."' 49  Justice O'Connor clarified that
other cases as far back as Winans, nine years after Race Horse, recognized that
native treaty usufructs are compatible with state sovereignty and natural re-
source management. 50 Further, the 1837 Treaty preserved Chippewa usufructs
143. Id at 203.
144. Id. at 202-03 (citing Dion, 476 U.S. at 738-40; Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at 690; Menominee,
391 U.S. at 413). See also discussion infra Section V (arguing that the Dion, Fishing Vessel, and
Menominee abrogation standards, as applied to the facts in Mille Lacsconstitute a defacto "explicitness
requirement" which is more difficult to satisfy than the Dion standard).
145. Id. at 203.
146. Id
147. Id.
148. Id. (quoting Race Horse, 163 U.S. at516). in dissent, the ChiefJustice argued that Race Horse
was reaffirmed in 1985 by the Klamath Tribe decision. Id. at 219. Justice O'Connor explained that
Klamath Tribe dealt only with the second part of the Race Horse holding: that the federal government
could require states to respect tribal usufructs, even if the state's admission act did not specifically say so.
ItL at 206-08. In Race Horse the Court agreed that the usufructs did not survive Wyonung statehood.
From this foundation, the Chief Justice argued that the usufructs in Klamath Tribe did not survive state-
hood because they were "temporary and precarious," as opposed to those that were permanent and in
"perpetuity." d at 219 (citing Race Horse, 163 U.S. at 515). Similarly, the Chief Justice saw the 1837
usufructs as temporary because they were subject to the pleasure of the President. Id. at 219-20 n. 3.
Disagreeing with ChiefJustice Rehnquist's analysis, and demonstrating the permanent nature of the 1837
usufructs, the majority illuminated the slippery slope that his reasomng could produce writing "any right
created by operation of federal law could be described as 'temporary and precarious,' because Congress
could eliminate the right whenever it wished." Id..at 207.
149. Id at 204.
150. Id. at204 (citing Fishing Vessel, 443 U.S. at690; Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194(1975);
Winans, 198 U.S. at 382-384).
190 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol.21
free of territorial, or state regulation, a freedom subject only to the pleasure of
the president, or reasonable and necessary conservation and safety laws.)
Consequently, statehood alone did not abrogate treaty usufructs, since they are
not inherently inconsistent with states' natural resource regulatory powers.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS
The Supreme Court's holding in Mille Lacs stands for three principles.
First, the opinion is an unequivocal reaffirmation of the importance of the
canons of Indian treaty interpretation acknowledged by the majority 5 ' and both
dissenting opinions. 53 Second, the decision builds on Dion's clear evidence
requirement by establishing a more stringent explicitness standard to abrogate
Native American treaty rights. 54 Third, Mille Lacs means that native treaty
usufructs are by their nature property rights-profits itprendre-which are not
inherently inconsistent with subsequent title transfers. Even in dissent, Chief
Justice Rehnquist referred to the usufructs as "real property interest[s].""'
A. Reaffirming the Canons
Historically, courts rely on the canons of Indian treaty interpretation to
determine native treaty rights in the face of subsequent congressional action. 
56
The Rehnquist Court, however, has routinely avoided utilizing the canons to
benefit the tribes.'57 Mille Lacs is an important decision because it affirms the
continuing relevancy of the canons, applying them prominently and broadly in
151. Id. at 204-05, 207. Justice Thomas dissented in an attempt to discredit the majority's reasoning
that the 1837 usufructs were durable property rights. He suggested that the 1837 Treaty only conveyed
a revokable "privilege" to hunt, fish and gather, as opposed to a more durable "right." Id. at 222-23
(Thomas, J. dissenting). The majority, affirming the nature of the usufruct as a property "right" stated that
the Court has never distinguished between rights and privileges regarding state regulatory authority.
Further, under the canons, the usufructs should be classified as property rights because there was no
evidence the Chippewa understood the intricate legal distinction between property rights and privileges
in 1837. Id. at 205-06.
152. Id. at 206.
153. Id. at 218, 222, 223.
154. Id. at 202-03.
155. Id. at 213.
156. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
157. See Ralph W Johnson & Berrie Martinis, Chief Justice Rehnquist and the Indian Cases, 16
PUB. LAND. L. REV. 1, 18 (1995) ("Whatever the subject, Rehnquist manages to construe the law to limit
or impair the governing powers and jurisdiction of Indian Tribes. This is in direct conflict with a basic
canon of Indian law."). See also Bourland, 508 U.S. at 687-88 (writing for the majority, Justice Thomas
acknowledged the canons, yet still held that the Flood Control Act, and Cheyenne River Act abrogated
rights under the Fort Laramie Treaty rights, even though those Acts made no mention of the treaty);
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191,208 n. 17 (1978) (Justice Rehnquist acknowledging the
canons, yet refusing to allow the tribe to prosecute alleged criminals living on their reservation because
those suspects were non-natives).
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favor of the natives. Between Mille Lacs majority opimon and its two dissents,
in fact, the canons are explicitly or implicitly acknowledged over ten times. 158
The canons require courts to interpret ambiguous treaty provisions in favor
of natives 59 as the natives understood the provisions at the tune of the treaty 160
When in doubt, courts should liberally construe treaty provisions to favor the
tribes. 161 However, the canons should not apply in the absence of ambiguity
The 1855 Treaty appears at first glance to show no ambiguity- Under the first
article of the Treaty, the Chippewa "fully and entirely relinquish[ed] any
and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature "throughout Minne-
sota. 62 But Justice O'Connor found ambiguity in this article because it did not
indicate whether the 1837 usufructs were specifically included in the provi-
sion's broad relinquishments.161 In light of this ambiguity, the Court proceeded
to apply the canons and interpreted the provision liberally to the benefit of the
Chippewa."6 Because the 1855 Treaty was ambiguous, and neither the treaty
lustory nor its negotiations suggested that the Chippewa understood the 1855
Treaty to abrogate treaty-guaranteed usufructs, the Court liberally construed
the provision in favor of the Band and declined to find abrogation.65
The Court also applied the canons to interpret whether the 1837 Treaty
authorized the 1850 Executive Order. The majority held the "pleasure of the
President" provision in the 1837 Treaty was not clear concerning Presidential
removal authority 166 Again, due to ambiguous language, the Court interpreted
the 1837 Treaty as the Chippewa would have understood it: to allow them to
exercise usufructs on ceded lands so long as they remained at peace with white
populations. 16 7 Interpreting the provision liberally in favor of the Band, the
Court held that the 1837 Treaty did not authorize the 1850 Executive Order. 168
Further, while Justice O'Connor noted a general presumption that executive
orders are legal, in this case the presumption runs into the canons. 169 As the
holding shows, the canons prevailed.170 Even in dissent, Chief Justice Rehn-
quist and Justice Thomas both acknowledged the applicability of the canons. 17 1
158. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200 (twice), 202 (twice), 203, 206, 215-16, 217, 218, 219, 223.
159. 1d at 206.
160. Id.
161. R at 200.
162. 1855 Treaty with the Chippewa, 10 Stat., art. I, 1165-66.
163. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200.
164. Id at 202.
165. Id. at 202, 206.
166. l at 189.
167. l at 193.
168. Id at 189-90.
169. Id. at 194, n.5.
170. Similarly, the Court relied on the canons to reject Minnesota's claim that the 1858 Admission
Act abrogated the Chippewa usufructs. Id. at 205. Because the Admission act was silent regarding treaty
rights, the Chippewa could not have understood the Act to abrogate their rights. Id -at 203.
171. Id at 218, 223.
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B. The Explicitness Standard
The pre-Mille Lacs standard for abrogation of native treaty rights was mal-
leable. Prior Supreme Court cases indicated that abrogation should be express
and should not be imputed casually 172 In the oft-cited Dion opinion, the Court
stated a preference for explicit congressional language to prove congressional
intent to abrogate rights, yet the Court did not require it. ' 7 3 Therefore, courts
could rely on less than specific congressional language to find treaty abroga-
tion, even without finding clear evidence of intent to abrogate in the legislative
history 17' In Mille Lacs, the Court raised the bar beyond Dion, clarifying that
the abrogation standard is a high hurdle, or what this note refers to as an "ex-
plicitness standard."'1
75
Citing Dion, Justice O'Connor reasoned that Congress must "clearly ex-
press" its intent to abrogate Indian treaty rights. 176 At first glance, this reliance
on Dion might seem to suggest that the Court merely maintained the status quo.
and that less than explicit congressional language would suffice to abrogate
native treaty rights, as it had in Bourland and Dion.177 But Mille Lacs demon-
strated that the Court superseded Dion and adopted an explicitness standard
requiring explicit congressional language, or "clearly express[ed]" evidence of
Congress' intent to abrogate treaty rights. ' The Court declined to find abro-
gation because neither the 1855 Treaty nor the treaty journal made an explicit
reference to hunting, fishing or gathering rights. 7 9 This part of the holding is
an endorsement of the explicitness standard because, on its face, the 1855
Treaty appeared to abrogate every land right the Chippewa ever had in Minne-
sota: Article I relinquished "any and all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever
nature the same may be, "to lands in Minnesota.' Still, the Court refused
to abrogate the Chippewa usufructs because the treaty language, while broad,
did not explicitly mention usufructs, and the state did not offer adequate evi-
dence to demonstrate that Congress "clearly expressed" an intent to abrogate
172. See Leavenworth Ry., 92 U.S. at 741-742; Menominee Tribe, 391 U.S. at 412-413; Dion, 476
U.S. at 739-40; Bourland, 508 U.S. at 679, 687, 689. See also supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
173. See Dion, 476 U.S. at 739.
174. In Dion the Bald Eagle Protection Act did not specifically abrogate native treaty nghts to hunt
bald eagles. Id. at 740. However, the Court still found abrogation because the language was "sweepingly
framed." Id. (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 56 (1979). See also Bourland, 508 U.S. at 679, 687,
689; supra note 86 and accompanying text.
175. Unlike the Dion and Bourland holdings, which allowed abrogation in light of less than explicit
congressional language, Mille Lacs made it clear that courts can only abrogate native treaty rights due to
congressional language when that language is explicit, or when there is "clearly express[ed]" evidence that
Congress intended abrogation. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202.
176. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202-03 (citing Dion, 476 U.S. at 740).
177 See Bourland and Dion discussion supra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
178. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202-03.
179. Id. at 195.
180. 1855 Treaty With the Chippewa, at 1165-1166.
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hunting, fishing or gathering rights.18'
The Court also held that the 1837 Treaty did not authorize removal, an
equally powerful endorsement of the explicitness standard. Although the treaty
clearly stated that Chippewa rights existed "at the pleasure of the President,"
the Court reasoned that because removal was not explicitly mentioned in the
Treaty, the President had no authority to order it. 182
C. The Nature of the Native Treaty Usufructs
Mille Lacs also stands for the proposition that native treaty usufructs are
property rights: profits liprendre. The Court's opinion demonstrates that these
property rights, though defeasible in specified circumstances, are quite durable.
With limited exceptions, usufructs are consistent with subsequent fee title
transfers, even to private property owners.18
3
First, Justice O'Connor made clear that the Court did not view native usu-
fructs as "grants" by the government of the "privilege" to hunt, fish and
gather.'84 Rather, the usufructs were a consequence of the Chippewa' s retained
property rights that the tribe held on ceded lands prior to the 1837 Treaty 185
Retention of some pre-treaty property rights included the continuing right to
access and occupy ceded lands and the right to take resources from those
lands.8 6 A right of access, combined with the right to take resources from
another's land, creates aprofitaprendre.'t 7 Further, while Chief Justice Rehn-
quist disagreed with nearly every aspect of the majority opinion's holding, he
conceded "[a]fter the Treaty was executed and ratified, the ceded lands be-
longed to the United States, and the only real property interest in the land
remaining to the Indians was the privilege to come onto it and hunt during the
pleasure of the President."' 88 Thus, both the Mille Lacs majority and the Chief
Justice in dissent acknowledged that native treaty usufructs are property rights.
Second, tribes'profits izprendre are not necessarily mconsistent with subse-
181. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 202-03.
182. Id. at 207.
183. These narrow exceptions include: necessary and non-discrimnitory state safety or conservation
regulations, id. at 205; congressional abrogation, id. at 202-03; or limits in the treaty such as "at the
pleasure of the President," in the 1837 Treaty with the Chippewa, at art. V or hunting rights confined to
"unoccupied lands" as was the case in Race Horse. Id. at 207.
184. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 201-02 (refuting Justice Thomas' contention that the 1837 usufructs
were not "rights" but only "privileges").
185. Id. at 194, n.5. Justice O'Connor stated "[tihe Chippewa were on the land long before the
United States acquired title to it. The 1837 treaty does not speak to the right of the United States to order
them off the land upon acquisition of title, and in fact, the usufructuary rights guaranteed by the Treaty
presumed that the Chippewa would continue to be on the land." See also Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
186. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 194, n.5.
187. Blumin & Swift, supra note 15, at 445.
188. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, C.J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
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quent transfers of fee simple title to private property owners. Even after ceded
lands were surveyed and sold to lumbermen, the Chippewa continued to hold
usufructuary rights on those now privately held lands." 9 This is consistent
with several Supreme Court and lower court holdings, beginning with Winans,
recognizing the enduring property nature of native treaty usufructs."9 ° It is
important to note, however, that these profits tprendre are defeasible in speci-
fied circumstances. The Court noted that under the 1837 Treaty with the Chip-
pewa the President could conceivably extinguish the Chippewa rights at will.''
Further, as Justice O'Connor explained, many other treaties limit native usu-
fructs to "unoccupied lands" or for as long as wild game populates the land.'
92
The Court also noted that the 1837 usufructs were free from regulation by
the Minnesota Territory, and later the state of Minnesota. 19 The Court then
concluded that today the Chippewa still enjoy the same freedom from state
regulation.194 But, importantly, the native right to self-regulation is not abso-
lute. The right is curtailed by states' authority to enact regulations that further
reasonable, necessary and non-discrinunatory conservation interests.195
VII. THE LEGACY
Mille Lacs answers a century-and-a-half old debate regarding the interpreta-
tion, durability, and nature of Native American treaty rights. According to
Mille Lacs, 1) the canons of Indian treaty interpretation must guide any legal
analysis of native treaty rights; 2) Congress cannot abrogate those rights with-
out explicit intent; and 3) treaty usufructs are real property rights, able to en-
dure subsequent fee title transfers to state governments or private individu-
als.' 96 This section considers three recent court decisions, arguing that all
should be re-examined in light of Mille Lacs.1' 7
189. Id. at 182.
190. See Blumm & Swift, supra note 15, at 484 n. 385. See also Mariel J. Combs, United States v.
Washington: The Boldt Decision Reincarnated, 29 ENVTL. L. 683, 711 (1999) (citing United States v.
Washington, 157 F.3d 630, 650-651 (recognizing a treaty property right to take shellfish from private
beds).
191. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 194.
192. Id. at 203.
193. Id. at 204.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See Id. at 196, 197,202,218.
197. The three cases are Washington Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation Irrigation District, 850
P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993)[hereinafter Washington DOE]; Nez Perce Tribe v. Idaho Power Co., 847 F. Supp.
791 (D. Idaho 1994); In Re SRBA, No. 39576, Order on Motions to Strike, Motion to Supplement the
Record and Motions for Summary Judgment (Idaho Nov. 11, 1999).
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A. Washington DOE
In 1993, the Wasington Supreme Court adopted a "dinunished treaty
rights" concept."gs In Washington Dep't of Ecology v. Yakima Reservation
Irrigation District, following a McCarran Amendment adjudication in state
court, the Yakima Nation argued that the Treaty of 1855 reserved a right to
adequate water flow to sustain fish populations in waters flowing through, or
adjacent to reservations. 99 The non-Indian imgation districts contended that
a history of litigation, legislation, and administrative actions since the treaty
either abrogated, or at least dimnished, tribal water rights.2" According to this
dirmshed rights concept, treaty abrogations do not require explicit language
or evidence of congressional intent to abrogate. The court instead held that
rights can be "diminished" by considering several disjointed congressional,
executive, administrative, and judicial acts in the aggregate? °t
The court spent the first half of its opinion affirming the applicability of the
canons, citing Choctaw Nation, Winters, Menominee, and Fishing Vessel.2 2
The opinion noted "[i]f the standard were one of reasonable inference from the
cumulative actions of Congress, then the Court rmght be able to find a dimin-
ishment of fishing rights."2 3 But, the court acknowledged, Congress must
actually consider the conflict.2°4 Yet the opinion inexplicably went on to hold
that while the Yakima rights were not abrogated, they were "dinmished" by
a series of government actions over the course of time. 5
Tins "diminished rights" concept is wholly inconsistent with Mille Lacs
which synthesized the holdings in Dion, Menominee, and Fishing Vessel and
developed an exceedingly narrow explicitness standard for abrogation.0 6 This
standard requires either explicit language from Congress or explicit evidence
of congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights.20 7 Nowhere does the Mille
Lacs explicitness standard allow for, or imply, that a diminished rights concept
198. See Blumn & Swift, supra note 15, at 475.
199. Washington DOE, 850 P.2d. at 1315-1317 (citing Treaty between the United States and the
Yakima Nation of Indians, June 9, 1855, art. 1Ii, 12 Stat. 951,952-53; Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S.
128, 141(1976)).
200. Washington DOE, 850 P.2d. at 1310.
201. Id at 1323.
202. Id. at 1317.
203. L at 1322.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1323. Specifically the court opined:
We therefore cannot conclude that the inconsistent actions of Congress, the executive branch and ad-
ministrative agencies, were sufficient, in and of themselves, to extinguish those reserved water rights
necessary to fulfill treaty fishing rights. We conclude, however, that there was encroachment upon and
sigiificant damage to the Indians' treaty fishing rights during this period. Thus although the treaty
rights were not extinguished, they were dinumshed (emphasis in original).
206. See discussion supra notes 168-178 and accompanying text.
207. See discussion supra notes 174-177 and accompanying text.
195
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exists. Indeed, the facts of Mille Lacs imply that diminishing treaty rights by
aggregating subsequent government actions is not an acceptable substitute for
explicit congressional intent to abrogate. For example, subsequent to the 1837
Treaty with the Chippewa, the government enacted three actions: an 1850
Executive Order, an 1855 Treaty, and Minnesota's statehood act.2°8 The Court
noted that many non-native interests interpreted these actions to weaken or
extinguish Chippewa usufructs. 9 However, finding no explicit congressional
intent to abrogate the Chippewa usufructs, the Court declined the state's abro-
gation claims, and did not even acknowledge the possibility of a diminished
rights concept.
In Washington DOE the state could only point to inconsistent congressional,
executive, administrative and judicial actions over six decades-concerning
irgation allocations-as evidence of abrogation or diminishment.21 ° None of
those actions contained explicit congressional language, or other explicit evi-
dence that Congress intended to abrogate or diminish Yakima treaty rights to
adequate water for fishing in favor of the rights of irrigation users. Because
these disjointed government actions do not demonstrate explicit congressional
intent to abrogate, the state court should not have applied the diminished rights
concept to the Yakima's treaty water rights.
B. Nez Perce
In 1855 the Stevens Treaty guaranteed the Nez Perce the right to take fish
from all usual and accustomed places in common with the temtory's citi-
zens.21" ' In Nez Perce Tribe v Idaho Power Co., the tribe sought property
damages under section ten of the Federal Power Act (FPA) when the Hells
Dam complex, licensed under the FPA, damaged fish runs. 2 ' The Idaho fed-
eral District Court held that the Nez Perce tribe's treaty fishing rights were not
property rights, and thus were not compensable under the FPA, which only
provides damages for losses to property As with Washington DOE, this deci-
sion is also incompatible with Mille Lacs, which recognized treaty usufructs
208. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 179-86.
209. Id. at 182. For example, the majority opinion noted that white lumbermen built a dam within
ceded lands on the Rum River and defended it with force in 1855 under the belief that the Chippewa no
longer held usufructs on those lands.
210. Washington DOE, 850 P.2d at 1322.
211. Nez Perce, 847 F.Supp. at 805 (cting Treaty between the United States and Nez Perce, June
I1, 1855. art. III, 12 Stat. 957). 1
212. Id. at 794. Hells Canyon Dam Complex is licensed under the FPA, and § 803(c) provides for
recovery to all parties whose "property" is damaged as the result of licensed dam building, operations or
maintenance. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 803(c) (1994).
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as durable property rights. 13
Like the 1855 Treaty with the Chippewa, courts should interpret the 1855
Treaty with the Nez Perce to reserve a property right in fish: a profit t
prendre. 4 Under the FPA, the tribe should have been compensated for dam-
ages to its property rights by the Idaho Power Company However, the court
failed to simply ask whether the tribe held a property right in the fish that the
Stevens Treaty guaranteed it. Instead, the Nez Perce court mischaracterized
the relevant question as whether the treaty granted the tribe an absolute prop-
erty right to preservation of fish runs as they existed in 1855.15 Under the
unnecessarily narrow constraints of its inquiry, the court reasoned that the 1855
Treaty only conveyed a limited, non-property right to the tribe to take fish in
common with territorial citizens.216 Because the court did not recogmze a tribal
property right in the fish destroyed by the building, operation, and maintenance
of the dam, it held that Idaho Power was not liable under section 803(c) of the
FPA for monetary damages to fish runs that were diunished.217
Mille Lacs calls the Nez Perce holding into question because the lower court
failed to recognize treaty usufructs as property rights. Both Justice O'Connor,
writing for the majority, and Chief Justice Rehnquist in dissent acknowledged
that treaty usufructs are property rights.218 According to the Court, in their
1837 Treaty with the Umted States, the Chippewa reserved rights to hunt, fish,
and gather on ceded lands during the pleasure of the President.219 For example,
Justice O'Connor acknowledged that these reserved usufructs are a portion of
the complete property rights that the Chippewa held in their lands prior to the
1837 Treaty 220 Likewise, Chief Justice Rehnquist agreed that the 1837 Treaty
usufructs are "real property interest[s] 22t
Similarly, the Nez Perce treaty fishing rights should be recognized as prop-
erty rights as well. The 1855 Treaty ceded tribal lands, but reserved the right
to continue to take fish "at all usual and accustomed places. 222 Indeed, even
the Nez Perce court acknowledged that "[t]the tribes reserved certain rights [to
fish] over the relinquished lands.,,223 As Justice O'Connor held in Mille Lacs,
213. See Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 194, n.5; see also supra notes 177-189 and accompanying text. See
also generally Allen H. Sanders, Damaging Indian Treaty Fisheries: A Violation of Tribal Property
Rights?, 17 PUB. LAND & REsouRcEs L. REv. 153, 162-67 (1996) (criticizing the Nez Perce court for
misunderstanding treaty-created property rights).
214. See supra notes 179-191 and accompanying text.
215. Nez Perce, 847 F. Supp. at 807.
216. Id. at 809.
217. Id. at 811.
218. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 204, 218.
219. Id. at 177.
220. Id. at 194 n.5.
221. Id. at 213 (Rehnquist, CJ. dissenting).
222. Nez Perce, 847 F. Supp. at 794.
223. Id. at 806 (emphasis added).
197
198 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW [Vol.21
treaty "reserved" usufructs are indeed property rights: a portion of the com-
plete, pre-treaty, property rights that native tribes once held.224 Because the
Nez Perce reserved profit a prendre rights to fish in the 1855 Treaty, and the
FPA provides for damages to property resulting from dam construction, opera-
tions and maintenance, and the court should have awarded pecuniary damages
to the tribe for fish destroyed by Hells Dam.
C. In Re SRBA
In Re SRBA contradicts Mille Lacs because the court refused to apply the
canons of Indian treaty construction, and failed to recognize off-reservation
treaty usufructs as profit a prendre property rights.2 5 In 1855, the Nez Perce
and the United States entered into a treaty which ceded tribal lands, but in
return stated "[t]he exclusive right of taking fish in all streams where running
through or bordering said reservation is secured to the Indians; as also the right
of taking fish at all usual and accustomed places in common with the citizens
of the territory "226 The tribe and the government, based on this language
and the canons of Indian treaty interpretation, argued that the Nez Perce re-
served a property right to fish both on and off-reservation lands, and that along
with those rights to fish, the tribe necessarily reserved, an implied "Indian
reserved water right" to adequate stream flows because minimum amounts of
water are necessary to sustain fish populations in both on and off-reservation
waters.227 While the court deferred the on-reservation water claims, because
they dealt with "federal reserved water rights," it held that the treaty did not
reserve an off-reservation property right to water.2 8 In Re SRBA is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with Mille Lacs because it failed to apply the canons to am-
biguous treaty language, and it did not recognize that off-reservation treaty
usufructs are property rights.
Although the court accurately articulated the canons of Indian treaty inter-
pretation, it failed to apply them to determine if an Indian reserved water right
existed to fulfill off-reservation fishing rights. From the court's perspective,
the treaty language was unambiguous; thus, the canons did not apply 229 How-
224. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 194 n.5.
225. In Re SRBA, at 30, 37.
226. Id. at 27 (citing Treaty between United States and Nez Perce, June 1i, 1855, Art. III, 12 Stat.
957).
227. Id. at 27 28. It is important to note that according to the court, an implied "Indian reserved
water right," is different that an implied "federal reserved water right." A implied federal reserved right,
commonly referred to as the "Winter's Doctrine," says that where public land withdrawals (such as Native
American reservations) are silent concerning water rights, a right to water on the withdrawn land will be
implied. However, an implied Indian reserved water right is a water right either reserved by treaty, or not
expressly ceded by a treaty or other agreement. Id. at 24.
228. Id. at 28-30.
229. Id. at 30.
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ever, the 1855 Treaty with the Nez Perce is no less ambiguous concerning
water rights than the 1855 Treaty with the Chippewa was ambiguous concern-
mg the forfeiture of usufructs in Mille Lacs. Both treaties used unspecific
language to define usufructs. Further, Mille Lacs made clear that under the
canons' pro-native directive, demonstrating ambiguity in treaty language is not
an onerous burden. For example, the 1855 Treaty with the Chippewa seems
unambiguous on its face. In part, the language reads "the said Indians do
further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United States, any and
all right, title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be, 230
However, even in the face of such unequivocal language, Justice O'Connor
held that the treaty language was ambiguous because it failed to specifically
mention relinquishment of usufructs; thus, the Court applied the canons.23
Based on Mille Lacs' endorsement of applying the canons in arguable cases
of ambiguity, the language in the 1855 Nez Perce Treaty was also ambiguous.
The language states that the tribes reserved the right to take fish "at all usual
and accustomed places "232 Because the language does not expressly
mention a right to "water" the state court concluded, without further reasoning,
that no off-reservation water right was reserved.233 However, the provision's
lack of specificity actually adds to its ambiguity For instance, the language
does not clarify what are "usual and accustomed places," and to reserve a right
to fish without a concomitant right to water to sustain the fish would seem self-
defeating. In light of the ambiguity in the 1855 Treaty language, the-court
should have applied the canons to recognize an off-reservation reserved water
right for the Nez Perce's expressly reserved treaty fishing rights.
Furthermore, the court's failure to apply the canons contributed to its errone-
ous holding that off-reservation treaty usufructs are not profit a prendre prop-
erty rights. In Mille Lacs, Justice O'Connor noted that the 1837 Treaty lan-
guage was ambiguous concerning the nature and durability of Chippewa hunt-
ing, fishing, and gathering rights on ceded lands.234 The Court explained that
under the canons, ambiguous treaties must be interpreted liberally to favor
natives. 5 Thus, the Court demed the state's argument that the Chippewa
usufructs were simply privileges, as opposed to property rights. Instead, the
majority interpreted the treaty language liberally, holding that the usufructs
were indeed durable property rights, not simply privileges. 6
In contrast to Mille Lacs, In Re SRBA refused to apply the canons, and in-
stead relied on the previously discussed and flawed Nez Perce Tribe decision,
230. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 184 (emphasis added).
231. See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
232. In Re SRBA at 27.
233. d.
234. Mille Lacs, 526 U.S. at 200.
235. IL
236. See id
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concluding that "[t]he Nez Perce do not have a property interest in the fish,"
and thus could not have a concomitant reserved water right.237 This holding
was also inconsistent with Supreme Court rulings prior to Mille Lacs, such as
Winans and its progeny However, in the wake of Mille Lacs' application of
the canons to recognize and preserve native property rights, and its majority
and dissenting opinions' agreement that off-reervation treaty usufructs are
property rights, the In Re SRBA court's failure to recognize Nez Perce fishing
and water rights as property was an error.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Treaties between the United States and Native Americans typically retained
tribal rights to live off of the land, specifically to hunt, fish and gather.238
Exercise of the usufructs often clashed with the interests of territorial and state
governments, as well as those of non-native settlers.239 These conflicts pro-
duced a long judicial history that sought to determine the nature and scope of
native treaty usufructs, as well as their susceptibility to abrogation.
The Supreme Court's decision in Minnesota v Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa
Indians answers these questions. The canons of Indian treaty interpretation
define the scope of ambiguous treaty rights: a narrow "explicitness standard"
requires explicit congressional language, "clear and express" evidence in the
legislative history, or surrounding circumstances to abrogate treaty rights; and
tribal usufructs are indeed durable real property rights, profits t prendre, that
are only subject to defeasibility under specific circumstances that are expressly
defined in the treaty
Mille Lacs heeded Justice Black's words of admonishment, and advisement
"[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their word. 24 ° In the nineteenth
century the United States secured vast lands at insignificant costs. In return,
the majonty of treaties reserved tribal profits a prendre to continue living off
of those ceded lands. In Mille Lacs, the Court recognized those rights as en-
during property rights. Absent explicit congressional intent, or payment ofjust
compensation, those rights must be honored; whether or not they remain conve-
nient.
237. In Re SRBA at 36.
238. See discussion supra note 5 and accompanying text.
239. See discussion supra note 14 and accompanying text.
240. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. at 142 (Black, J. dissenting).
